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HB+DB: Mitigating Man-in-the-Middle Attacks against HB+ with Distance Bounding.

Elena Pagnin (Institutionen för data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system (Chalmers) ) ; Anjia Yang ; Gerhard Hancke ; Aikaterini Mitrokotsa (Institutionen för data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system (Chalmers) )
Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (ACM WiSec 2015), New York, United States, 22-26 June p. 1-6. (2015)
[Konferensbidrag, refereegranskat]

Authentication for resource-constrained devices is seen as one of the major challenges in current wireless communication networks. The HB+ protocol performs device authentication based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem and simple computational steps, that renders it suitable for resource-constrained devices such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. However, it has been shown that the HB+ protocol as well as many of its variants are vulnerable to a simple man-in-the-middle attack. We demonstrate that this attack could be mitigated using physical layer measures from distance-bounding and simple modifications to devices’ radio receivers. Our hybrid solution (HB+DB) is shown to provide both effective distance-bounding using a lightweight HB+-based response function, and resistance against the man-in-the-middle attack to HB+. We provide experimental evaluation of our results as well as a brief discussion on practical requirements for secure implementation.

Nyckelord: distance-bounding, HB protocol, HB+, physical layer security



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Denna post skapades 2015-11-28. Senast ändrad 2016-08-22.
CPL Pubid: 226508

 

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