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Incentive Schemes and Female Leadership in Financial Firms

Björn Lantz (Institutionen för teknikens ekonomi och organisation, Operations Management) ; Petra Bredehorst-Carlsson ; Johan Johansson
Corporate Board : Role, Duties & Composition (1810-8601). Vol. 9 (2013), p. 40-49.
[Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig]

Our purpose is to explore how performance in Swedish financial companies is affected by the presence of a female chief executive officer (CEO), the presence of an incentive scheme, and the proportion of female board members. The results indicate that a female CEO is associated with a lower return on equity (ROE) and a lower Tobin’s Q, but we find no significant association between the proportion of female board members and firm performance. An incentive scheme is generally associated with a lower return on assets (ROA) and a higher Tobin’s Q. In particular, a share-based incentive scheme is associated with a lower ROA, a lower ROE, and a higher Tobin’s Q.



Denna post skapades 2013-10-31. Senast ändrad 2014-02-05.
CPL Pubid: 185938

 

Institutioner (Chalmers)

Institutionen för teknikens ekonomi och organisation, Operations Management (2006-2016)

Ämnesområden

Företagsekonomi

Chalmers infrastruktur