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**Harvard**

Isaksson, M., Kindeler, G. och Mossel, E. (2010) *The geometry of manipulation - A quantitative proof of the gibbard satterthwaite theorem*.

** BibTeX **

@conference{

Isaksson2010,

author={Isaksson, Marcus and Kindeler, G. and Mossel, E.},

title={The geometry of manipulation - A quantitative proof of the gibbard satterthwaite theorem},

booktitle={2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010; Las Vegas, NV; 23 October 2010 through 26 October 2010},

isbn={978-076954244-7},

pages={319-328 },

abstract={We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function f of q >= 4 alternatives and n voters will be manipulable with probability at least 10(-4)epsilon(2)n(-3)q(-30), where epsilon is the minimal statistical distance between f and the family of dictator functions.
Our results extend those of [1], which were obtained for the case of 3 alternatives, and imply that the approach of masking manipulations behind computational hardness (as considered in [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]) cannot hide manipulations completely.
Our proof is geometric. More specifically it extends the method of canonical paths to show that the measure of the profiles that lie on the interface of 3 or more outcomes is large. To the best of our knowledge our result is the first isoperimetric result to establish interface of more than two bodies.},

year={2010},

}

** RefWorks **

RT Conference Proceedings

SR Electronic

ID 136789

A1 Isaksson, Marcus

A1 Kindeler, G.

A1 Mossel, E.

T1 The geometry of manipulation - A quantitative proof of the gibbard satterthwaite theorem

YR 2010

T2 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010; Las Vegas, NV; 23 October 2010 through 26 October 2010

SN 978-076954244-7

SP 319

OP 328

AB We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function f of q >= 4 alternatives and n voters will be manipulable with probability at least 10(-4)epsilon(2)n(-3)q(-30), where epsilon is the minimal statistical distance between f and the family of dictator functions.
Our results extend those of [1], which were obtained for the case of 3 alternatives, and imply that the approach of masking manipulations behind computational hardness (as considered in [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]) cannot hide manipulations completely.
Our proof is geometric. More specifically it extends the method of canonical paths to show that the measure of the profiles that lie on the interface of 3 or more outcomes is large. To the best of our knowledge our result is the first isoperimetric result to establish interface of more than two bodies.

LA eng

DO 10.1109/FOCS.2010.37

LK http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2010.37

OL 30