CPL - Chalmers Publication Library
| Utbildning | Forskning | Styrkeområden | Om Chalmers | In English In English Ej inloggad.

Fixing the contract after the contract is fixed: a study of incomplete contracts in IT and construction projects

Ulrika Badenfelt (Institutionen för teknikens ekonomi och organisation, Innovationsteknik)
International Journal of Project Management (0263-7863). Vol. 29 (2011), 5, p. 568-576 .
[Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig]

This paper aims to increase our understanding of collective outcomes by exploring both micro- and macro-level strategies for dealing with problems arising from incomplete contracts. By combining theories dealing with risk-sharing under various degrees of uncertainty (financial incentives and long-term relationships) with respect to social influence tactics involved in negotiations concerning additional work and changes, a useful framework was created. Case data regarding Swedish interorganizational development projects from both the construction and IT industries are used to illustrate the theoretical arguments. Findings indicate that social norms and the work-related values and attitudes of key negotiators significantly affect project outcomes. Efforts to increase the sophistication of financial incentives and long-term arrangements (e.g., standardized routines concerning risk-sharing and collaborative initiatives) do not seem to pay-off.

Nyckelord: Interorganizational projects; Incomplete contracts; Financial incentives; Influence tactics

Den här publikationen ingår i följande styrkeområden:

Läs mer om Chalmers styrkeområden  

Denna post skapades 2010-12-08. Senast ändrad 2011-07-13.
CPL Pubid: 130443


Läs direkt!

Länk till annan sajt (kan kräva inloggning)

Institutioner (Chalmers)

Institutionen för teknikens ekonomi och organisation, Innovationsteknik (2005-2016)


Building Futures
Informations- och kommunikationsteknik
Hållbar utveckling

Chalmers infrastruktur