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Game authority for robust and scalable distributed selfish-computer systems

Shlomi Dolev ; Elad Michael Schiller (Institutionen för data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system, Datakommunikation och distribuerade system (Chalmers)) ; P. G. Spirakis ; Philippas Tsigas (Institutionen för data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system (Chalmers) )
Theoretical Computer Science (0304-3975). Vol. 411 (2010), 26-28, p. 2459-2466.
[Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig]

Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to noncooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Nyckelord: Distributed computing, Game theory, Game authority, Self-stabilization

Denna post skapades 2010-07-01. Senast ändrad 2014-11-10.
CPL Pubid: 123567


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