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I trust you, I trust you not: a longitudinal study of control mechanisms in incentive contracts

Ulrika Badenfelt (Institutionen för teknikens ekonomi och organisation, Innovationsteknik)
Construction Management and Economics (0144-6193). Vol. 28 (2010), 3, p. 301-310.
[Artikel, refereegranskad vetenskaplig]

The relationship between trust and control in client–contractor interactions is explored, focusing on the control mechanisms used in a construction project. A longitudinal case study of a large laboratory construction project found that the client used a variety of control mechanisms to ensure that the contractor behaved trustworthily. Empirical data were gathered through interviews and non-participant observation. The results indicate that the use of control mechanisms is part of a complex and dynamic socially constructed process that requires ongoing discussion and evaluation, and to which informal control mechanisms are central. Business relationships built solely on trust are seemingly rare; even in trust-based collaborative settings, such as partnering arrangements; the contracting parties must pay attention to trust-nurturing actions.

Nyckelord: Longitudinal study, trust, control mechanisms, partnering arrangements, target cost contracts

Denna post skapades 2010-04-16.
CPL Pubid: 119879


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Institutioner (Chalmers)

Institutionen för teknikens ekonomi och organisation, Innovationsteknik (2005-2016)


Industriell teknik och ekonomi

Chalmers infrastruktur